Abstract-As a variation of ordinary digital signature scheme, a proxy signature scheme able a proxy signer to sign messages on behalf of the original signer. Proxy multi-signature is an extension of the basic proxy signature primitive and permits two or more entities to delegate their signing capabilities to the same other entity. In proxy multi-signature, many original signers can delegate their signing power to a proxy signer in such a way that the proxy signer can sign any message on behalf of original signers. In blind signature, the signer cannot make a linkage between the blind signature and the identity of the requester. Proxy blind multi-signature is the combination of proxy multi-signature and blind signature. Recently, Lu et al. presented a proxy blind multi-signature scheme which did not need a secure channel. However, in this paper, we show that Lu et al.'s scheme does not satisfy the unforgeability and also shown that their scheme is not secure against the original signer's forgery attack and the proxy signer's forgery attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of proxy signature was first introduced by Mambo et al. [1] , [2] in 1996. In a proxy signature scheme, an original signer can delegate his signing capacity to a proxy signer who can sign any message on behalf of the original singer. Blind signature was firstly introduced by David Chaum [3] in 1983. Blind signature is a signature on a message signed by another party without having any information about the message. Blind signatures are applicable where sender's privacy is important such as digital cash transaction, electronic voting systems etc. A proxy blind signature scheme combines the properties of proxy signature and blind signature schemes. In a proxy blind signature scheme, the proxy signer is allowed to generate a blind signature on behalf of the original signer.
The first proxy blind signature scheme was introduced by Lin and Jan [4] 
B. Generation of Proxy Sub Secret Key
Every original signer A i (1≤ i ≤n) produces sub proxy secret s i and makes signcryption on it, then sends it to proxy signer B in any manner. 1) Select
at random and compute (r i , s i ).
where m w is the designated proxy warrant negotiated by all original signers, which records the delegation policy including limit of authority, valid period of delegation, proxy signature, all identities and the public keys of the original signers.
2) Again select If it holds, s i will be accepted, otherwise, it will be rejected.
D. Generation of Proxy Secret Key
After proxy signer B received n valid s i (1≤ i≤ n), he can generate the proxy secret key s k If it is holds, anyone can be convinced (e*, y*) is a valid proxy blind multi-signature on message m. Otherwise, it will be rejected.
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF LU ET AL.'S PROXY BLIND MULTI SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this section, we demonstrate two kinds of forgery attacks on Lu et al.'s [9] scheme.
A. The Original Signer's Forgery
We show that Lu et al.'s proxy blind multi-signature scheme is insecure against the original signers' forgery. In order to forge a proxy blind multi-signature, the n dishonest original signers can compute is a valid proxy blind multi-signature, thus the original signers succeed to forge a proxy signature.
IV. THE PROXY SIGNER'S FORGERY
Here, we show that the proxy signer can perform the universal forgery for any selected message. Assume that the proxy signer wants to generate a signature for message m, he can select 
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have reviewed Lu et al.'s proxy blind multi-signature scheme which did not need a secure channel. We show that Lu et al.'s scheme does not satisfy the unforgeability and also shown that their scheme is insecure against the original signers' forgery attacks and the proxy signers' forgery attacks.
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